A Wishlist Is Not a Sale
A marketer mistook me for a game developer. His $1-per-wishlist pitch grew into a hypothetical $6,000 spending scenario, built around a purchase rate he later said was only an assumption.
On November 11, 2026, someone contacted me on Discord and offered to grow the wishlists for what he believed was my Steam game. He said he had found it on Steam. There was one problem: I have never developed a game.
I kept the conversation going to understand the offer. He quoted $0.85–$1 per wishlist. When I asked what it might take to sell 2,000 copies at launch, his suggested 30% wishlist-to-purchase rate led to a calculation of roughly $6,000 and more than a year of promotion. In his formal response, he later clarified that 30% was an assumption, not a result he had measured.
I examined the screenshots he supplied, checked his explanation of Steamworks tracking, and spoke with a paying customer. Here is what the records support—and what remains unverified.
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Why I wanted to understand the offer
My concerns did not begin with this message. I had previously worked with developers who told me they planned to buy wishlists through Fiverr. In one project, I had spent a year on daily follow-ups. I told them that if they went ahead with buying wishlists, I would not continue working with them. They went ahead anyway.
That was painful. I wanted their game to succeed. My boundary was about an approach I could not support, not an opportunity to say, “I told you so.” That earlier experience explains my interest in this subject; it is not evidence about the marketer in this investigation.
Paying for promotion and buying an unexplained increase in a counter are not the same proposition. Before I put my name behind a campaign, I need to understand how it reaches people and what its results represent. The same question runs through our conversation with Jin Oh about indie-game marketing and knowing your audience: who is the game for, and why would those players want it?
How did he find me—and why did he think I made the game?
The marketer identified himself as Matthew Abisoye and used the Discord name Diamite. In his opening message, he said he had found my Steam game on Steam. He directed me to his promotional X account, @Indie_gamespot.
When I asked which game he meant, he named Rotten Sails. I know its developer, Alp. Matthew acknowledged he had not worked on the game. In his later written response, he said he had first pitched Alp and then messaged me by mistake.
That still leaves a question: how did he find my Discord account and associate it with a game I do not own? His explanation accounts for the mistaken message, but not how he originally made that connection. I still do not know.
I did not immediately correct the assumption. I continued the conversation as a prospective customer might, sometimes using the hypothetical phrase “my game,” to understand the prices, evidence, and proposed terms. I never paid for or authorized a campaign. I later identified myself as a journalist, sent a formal right-of-reply email, and explained that I was verifying facts for an article rather than arranging a purchase.
When I asked whether his wishlist figures were guaranteed, Matthew wrote:
“Well it is an estimate based on a timeline”
He estimated around 100 “real and organic wishlists” per week and quoted $0.85–$1 per wishlist. He later proposed $500 upfront for six weeks of promotion targeting 600 wishlists. When I asked about paying in stages, he also agreed to begin with 50%. He described the wishlist target as an estimate from the start, not a guarantee.
The 30% assumption behind a $6,000 calculation
To examine the potential return, I posed a hypothetical goal: selling 2,000 copies during launch week. I asked how many wishlists that would require and what share he expected to become buyers. Matthew recommended a 30% wishlist-to-purchase conversion rate.
I then asked whether that meant roughly $6,000 and more than a year of promotion. He agreed. Taking the 30% assumption literally would mean about 6,667 wishlists. At $0.85–$1 each, that comes to approximately $5,667–$6,667; at 100 wishlists per week, about 67 weeks. This was my calculation for a hypothetical target of 2,000 sales, not a $6,000 quote for 2,000 wishlists.
The unanswered question was what evidence supported the 30% rate. On November 12, I sent Matthew formal right-of-reply questions with a 24-hour response window. He replied promptly and wrote:
“The 30% was an assumption for ROI math, not a result or a typical rate.”
That clarification is important. The projected spending depended on an assumed purchase rate rather than recorded sales results from his campaigns.
Valve’s wishlist guidance also warns against using wishlist totals as a reliable sales forecast. Players save games for different reasons, and interest is not a commitment to purchase.
One campaign: 103 reported wishlists, still unconfirmed
Matthew denied using bots. He said a developer’s Steamworks UTM report attributed 103 wishlists to his promotional link over seven days. That campaign was the basis for his weekly estimate:
“It was one campaign, not a guarantee.”
He supplied screenshots, a tracking link, and a developer contact. I asked the developer to confirm the campaign and whether the screenshots matched the relevant records, but had not received a response by the time of writing. I promised that developer anonymity and am withholding their identity and game title. The 103-wishlist figure remains an attributed claim, not an independently verified result. No reply does not mean the claim is false.
Valve’s UTM Analytics documentation confirms that Steamworks can report wishlist additions, purchases, and activations attributed to eligible tracked visits within 72 hours of a tracked link click. It is not merely a click counter. Reports can be filtered by campaign and exported as CSV files, although tracking has limitations.
Matthew said the report showed zero purchases. The supplied store preview listed the game as unreleased, so zero purchases cannot demonstrate a failed launch. A time-limited attribution report is not a lifetime sales report, either.
Even confirmation of all 103 wishlists would establish the reported result for one campaign—not that it could be repeated every week, for another game, or that 30% of those players would buy at launch. Those are separate claims requiring separate evidence.
What a developer received for $5
The second reference was a different kind of customer. The developer speaking under the name Tongue N’ Cheek confirmed paying $5 for one X advertisement after the release of pnoq. Steam credits the game to Tongue In Cheek Productions LLC. The developer gave permission to identify the company and game and said the small purchase was made largely out of curiosity.
He said Matthew had initially offered 40 advertisements for $200. In the developer’s comparison, that would have been nearly as much as the company made during its opening week. He did not purchase that larger package. I have not independently examined the original offer or the company’s revenue records; those details are his account, not an audited financial comparison.
Asked about the work for this customer, Matthew described it as “a post only no promised results.” He supplied two links to X promotions. The previews in our correspondence show posts dated November 10 and 12, both marked #ad. That supports a narrower account than a wishlist package: the customer bought promotional posting, without promised wishlist or sales results.
The two previews advertised five free Steam keys. I asked the developer whether he had authorized that giveaway. He said he had suggested it and supplied the keys. He also explained why there were two versions of the promotion.
According to the developer, Matthew made the first advertisement. After the developer raised concerns, Matthew offered a free repost. The developer produced replacement artwork using the game’s own assets and visual style, and Matthew posted it. The developer explained:
“He reposted it, same promo, same keys.”
This was not evidence of two separately purchased campaigns, or ten giveaway keys. It was an original post and a revised promotion using the same giveaway. The developer felt he had done much of the creative work himself:
“I ended up doing all the major work lol”
But he immediately added:
“but again, for 5$ I don’t expect perfection.”
He also described Matthew as someone who “has been honest and worked well with me so far,” and praised his willingness to answer challenging questions.
This customer confirms that promotional work was delivered and a free correction was offered. He questions its value for small studios; he has not supplied sales results or verified the separate wishlist campaign.
Payment details deserve the same scrutiny as the pitch
When our original conversation reached payment, Matthew asked whether I could use cryptocurrency. I declined and asked for a formal invoice and a conventional payment method. He then supplied bank details in another person’s name, describing the account holder as a friend.
In his written response, Matthew said he did not have an account able to receive international payments and that his friend received money for him without having a role in the promotional work. He offered to use a platform that could pay into his own account. He also said he did not have formal invoices but could share order and message records.
He described refunding a wishlist shortfall at the agreed per-wishlist price. I did not purchase a campaign, so I did not test that refund arrangement. I have not established wrongdoing from the payment method. My practical concern is knowing who is responsible for the work, who receives the money, what is being purchased, and what happens if the agreed delivery falls short.
After the right of reply, the sales questions continued
I explained the purpose of the reporting more than once. On November 12, I sent a right-of-reply email about an upcoming Fix Gaming Channel investigation and notified Matthew on Discord. I identified myself as the outlet’s Founder and Editor-in-Chief, personally handling the investigation. He answered the email and supplied references.
When he continued asking about a campaign, I explicitly told him:
“I’m simply verifying the evidence for my investigation, not arranging a marketing campaign or payment.”
He later asked:
“Are you ready to pay, so that I can work on your game too?”
The same uncertainty appeared when I asked permission to reproduce selected messages from our conversation in the article. I explained that the screenshots would show readers our original discussion of $0.85–$1 per wishlist and the 30% sales-conversion estimate. He replied:
“To be sincere I’m not understanding this anymore”
He said the exchange had continued without confirmation of whether we would work together, and asked:
“Also another game, do you also own a game or are you just making enquiries?”
He also asked whether I was a freelancer because he had noticed that I offered services. My initial approach could have encouraged the expectation of a sale, and some later replies focused on awaiting verification. But the subsequent explanations of my role and the article were explicit. He was still asking about a commercial relationship after receiving—and answering—questions for a journalistic investigation. The record does not establish whether he misunderstood that distinction or hoped I might also become a customer.
What I would check before paying for promotion
Price alone does not establish quality. I would ask the same questions of any promotional provider.
Define the deliverable. Is the payment for posts, artwork, targeted outreach, or a promised number of wishlist additions? Record the account, dates, approval process, and reporting requirements. Agree who supplies creative material and giveaway keys, and what a correction or refund covers. The pnoq exchange shows why that scope should be clear even for a $5 trial.
Check the evidence in the relevant report. A verifiable post shows what was published. A campaign report can show attributed activity. A customer reference can describe that customer’s transaction. None automatically establishes the others. Keep paid purchases separate from free-key activations, and do not treat social-media engagement as a sales figure.
Challenge the financial assumption. Ask where an estimated purchase rate comes from, how many comparable campaigns support it, and what happens to the budget if it is wrong. A price per wishlist cannot tell you whether a campaign will pay for itself without evidence about the people reached and the purchases that follow.
Audience fit and useful presentation should come before chasing a target total. Aidan Minter makes that practical case in our guide to combining press and creator outreach, which emphasizes researching relevant contacts rather than treating exposure as interchangeable.
A marketing budget needs more than an assumption
There is nothing embarrassing about an indie developer trying an advertisement or asking for marketing help. The question is whether the evidence supports the expectations used to sell that help.
The documented weakness in this pitch was the gap between the sales calculation and its supporting evidence. A hypothetical budget of roughly $6,000 depended on a 30% purchase rate that Matthew later described as an assumption. His reported wishlist result has not been independently confirmed and, even if confirmed, would not validate that sales forecast.
Matthew answered the questions and supplied references. A customer confirmed receiving promotional work and a free correction. This investigation did not establish fraud, fabricated reports, or bot-generated wishlists. It established why a delivered post, a reported wishlist addition, and an expected sale must not be treated as interchangeable results.
Before spending against a forecast, ask which figures were measured, which were estimated, and which were simply assumed. A marketing budget should not depend on those categories being blurred.
Related Reading
Jin Oh on Indie Games, Marketing and Knowing Your Audience
Streamers and Press — Combining Strategy
Written by Ronny Fiksdahl, Founder & Editor-in-Chief of Fix Gaming Channel.
Send interview pitches, corrections, tips, or developer stories to contact@fixgamingchannel.com.
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